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Abstract 
 
Limited access of entrepreneurs to credit constrains the creation and growth of private 
firms. In Africa, access to credit is particularly limited for small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) due to unclear property rights and the lack of assets that can be used as collateral. 
This paper presents a model where firm creation and growth hinge on matching potential 
entrepreneurs with productive technologies, while firm growth depends on acquired 
capital. The shortage of collateral creates a binding credit constraint on borrowing by 
SMEs and hence private sector growth and employment, even though the banking sectors 
have ample liquidity, as is the case in many African countries. The model is tested using 
a sample of 20 African countries over the period 2005-09. The empirical results suggest 
that policies aimed at easing the binding credit constraints (e.g., the depth of credit 
information and the strength of legal rights pertaining to collateral and bankruptcy) would 
stimulate productive entrepreneurship and private sector employment in Africa.   
 
 
Key words: credit constraints; productive entrepreneurship; employment, policies 
 
JEL codes: G21, L26, D24 
 
 
                                                 
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the African Economic Conference 2011 (October, in 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia). The authors thank Jose Pineda for helpful comments. The views expressed are 
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of their institutional affiliation. E-mail addresses: 
mbaliamo@unf.edu, Zuzana.Brixiova@undp.org, ndiku@econs.umass.edu. 
 1
1. Introduction 
 
While most African countries have recently recorded relatively high growth, even during 
and in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, their productivity gap with more 
advanced economies is still substantial. A key reason is the continued prevalence of low-
productivity activities, including a large share of subsistence agriculture. As experiences 
from more developed regions have shown, the transition to activities with higher value 
added content requires the emergence of productive entrepreneurship, nurtured not only 
by market dynamics but also by effective and well-targeted policies. In particular, the 
development of productive entrepreneurship requires a business environment that 
facilitates access to credit for new high-potential enterprises.  
 
Entrepreneurs everywhere cite limited availability of finance as a major obstacle to their 
activities (Stein et al., 2010), but this constraint is especially binding in Africa. According 
to the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys, about 45 percent of firms in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) identify access to finance as a key obstacle to their business, relative to 13 percent 
in OECD countries. Access to credit and hence firm creation and growth in SSA is 
constrained by, among others, distortions in the financial markets, especially high 
collateral requirements and poorly designed and enforced property rights.   
 
This paper utilizes a theoretical framework where firm creation and growth hinge on 
matching the searching entrepreneurs with production technologies and access to credit. 
Limited credit due to the lack of collateral slows the creation and growth of new private 
firms, thus hampering also job creation. The model is suitable to many African countries 
where financial frictions stem from the limited collateral and a weak legal framework. It 
generates two empirically important results. First, access to investment capital arises as a 
binding constraint to entrepreneurship, and this constraint prevails even in the presence of 
excess liquidity in the banking sector. A key constraint to access to credit is the shortage 
of collateralizable assets. Second, legal rights and informational depth in credit markets 
are shown to support firm creation and growth, and hence private sector employment. 
 
The model is tested using data for a sample of 20 African countries over the period 2005-
09. We use as indicator for entrepreneurship a measure of ‘new business density’, 
proxied by the new business registration per one thousand people aged 15-64 (from the 
World Bank’s Doing Business database). The results of the empirical analysis point to 
possible policy interventions that may help alleviate credit constraints and encourage 
entrepreneurship. 
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. After this introduction, the next section 
reviews the theoretical and empirical literature, with a focus on the determinants of 
entrepreneurship and the impact of institutional and policy reforms on entrepreneurship. 
The third section presents the theoretical model that underlies the empirical analysis. 
Section 4 contains the empirical analysis and the regression results. Section 5 summarizes 
the findings and discusses policy implications and possible policy interventions that may 
help address the constraints to entrepreneurship with a focus on the access to credit.  
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2. Overview of the literature 
 
2.1 Theoretical literature  
 
Given the high persistence of unemployment, working poverty, underemployment and 
vulnerable employment in Africa, policy makers have put increasing emphasis on 
supporting productive entrepreneurship and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to 
achieve high growth with job creation. This focus is driven by recognition that while 
‘necessity’ (i.e., low productivity) entrepreneurship is abundant in Africa, the potential of 
an ‘opportunity’ or high productivity entrepreneurship has been mostly untapped. The 
unutilized potential impedes Africa’s growth and employment, as the opportunity 
entrepreneurship is found to have a significant positive effect on development, while 
necessity entrepreneurship has almost none (Acs and Varga, 2005).  
 
This paper focuses on creation and growth of productive private firms. As Baumol (1990) 
underscored, while the extent of entrepreneurship across societies is mostly given, 
policies impact whether potential entrepreneurs enter into highly productive, less 
productive or even destructive activities. Among other objective, such policies strive to 
overcome both financial and non-financial (regulatory) constraints, which have impeded 
productive entrepreneurship and employment across developing countries. Brixiova 
(2010) developed a model of non-financial constraints to firm creation in Africa’s low 
income countries, including skill shortages of potential workers and entrepreneurs. In this 
paper, we focus on financial constraints to productive entrepreneurship. 
  
In Africa, financial constraints to entrepreneurship are particularly severe because of 
unclear property rights and restrictions on using assets such as land as collateral. To 
reflect this fact, the framework presented below is a streamlined version of Brixiova and 
Kiyotaki (1997) who modelled how credit constraints slow down the creation and growth 
of private firms in transition economies in the early stages of transition, where the 
productive private sector was emerging and the financial sector underdeveloped. In turn, 
they build on research by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) on the role of credit constraints in 
economies where a durable productive asset (land) acts as collateral.2 
 
Iyigun and Rodrik (2005) developed a theoretical model where investment decisions and 
policy outcomes are subject to uncertainty and examine the growth effects of the 
interaction between institutional and policy reform and entrepreneurship. Their model 
showed that institutional reform has a negative growth effect in settings where 
entrepreneurial activity is vibrant but has a positive impact where entrepreneurial activity 
is weak. The authors concluded that institutional reform would be more successful where 
the level of entrepreneurship is weak. They then assessed the empirical relevance of their 
model using cross-sectional data and the ratio of self-employed to total non-agricultural 
employment as an indicator of entrepreneurship. They found that the relationship 
                                                 
2 A decrease in asset (land) prices then lowers the value of collateral and investment in the credit-
constrained sector. Hart and Moore (1994) show formally how the possibility of default puts a limit on the 
amount of borrowing that entrepreneurs can undertake for even highly profitable projects.  
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between institutional reform and entrepreneurship is negative and statistically significant, 
and interpret this result as empirical evidence in support of their theoretical proposition. 
 
More recently, Aghion, Fally and Scarpetta (2007) examined the impact of private credit 
availability and stock market capitalization on firm entry and growth in advanced and 
emerging market economies. While their framework advances both theoretical and 
empirical literature, it is not directly applicable to most African countries where stock 
markets and more broadly non-bank financial institutions are either missing or still 
severely underdeveloped.  
 
2.2 Empirical literature  
 
The empirical literature relevant to the issues we examine in this paper relates to two 
areas: (i) the empirical research on the determinants of entrepreneurship—in particular 
the role of credit and liquidity—and (ii) empirical studies on policy and institutional 
reforms and their impact on entrepreneurship.3  
 
The role of information sharing and lender and borrower legal rights for access to credit 
is key for this study. Some studies have found that information sharing facilitates access 
to credit (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002; Djankov et al., 2007; Brown et al., 2009).4 
However, Negrin (2001) shows that wider information sharing led to less access to bank 
credit for small and medium-sized firms in Mexico. Regarding whether better legal rights 
ease access to credit, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) find that the proportion of 
firms using long-term external financing is larger in countries with efficient legal 
systems. Since long-term external finance is often necessary for long-term investment, 
credit constraints for entrepreneurs planning to undertake long-term projects may be 
greater in countries with inefficient legal systems.5  
 
Qian and Strahan (2007) show that the effects of creditor rights on loans depend on 
borrowers’ characteristics such as the size and tangibility of their assets. Specifically, 
foreign banks “appear especially sensitive to the legal and institutional environment, with 
their ownership declining relative to domestic banks as creditor protection falls” (p. 
2803). This result is particularly relevant to African countries that rely highly on the 
presence of foreign banks. Using data from 12 transition countries, Haselmann et al. 
(2010) find that the supply of bank credit increased after a legal change and that changes 
in collateral law matter more than changes in bankruptcy law for increased bank lending.  
The second line of empirical research focuses on the effects of policy and institutional 
reforms on the creation and growth of entrepreneurial activity. However, most of the 
                                                 
3 For a recent review of literature on the links between entrepreneurship, reforms, and development 
(growth), see Baliamoune-Lutz (2010). More broadly, for studies on links between financial development 
and growth see, for example, King and Levine 1993, Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Baliamoune-Lutz and 
Ndikumana, 2007; Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2008; and Baliamoune-Lutz, 2011. 
4 See also the survey by Japppelli and Pagano (2000). 
5 Using data from 49 countries and controlling for legal origin, La Porta et al. (1998) report “that common-
law countries generally have the strongest, and French civil-law countries the weakest, legal protections of 
investors, with German- and Scandinavian-civil-law countries located in the middle.” 
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studies have examined the effects of tax system reforms, and focused primarily on OECD 
countries and in many cases using micro-level (firm-level or individual) data. However, a 
limited number of studies have focused on other reforms besides taxation. Using 
establishment-level data from the manufacturing sector, Gaston and Werner (2002) 
explore the effects of financial liberalization on fixed investment in Mexico, focusing on 
the role of real estate as collateral. They find that financial constraints were reduced for 
the smallest firms, but not for larger ones, and given that banks relied on collateral in 
their lending decision, the importance of having real estate rose. 
 
Baliamoune-Lutz (2007) empirically tests the Iyigun-Rodrik (2005) model using data 
from developed and developing countries and exploring the role of institutional and 
policy reforms on contributions of entrepreneurship to development. She also finds that 
the effect of policy reforms (trade reforms, proxied by openness to trade) is negative 
when entrepreneurial activity is weak and positive when it is vibrant, while the effects of 
institutional reforms (measured by the International Country Risk Guide composite 
index) is positive when the level of entrepreneurship is low and negative when it is high.  
 
Finally, Baliamoune-Lutz (2010) focuses only on developing countries and uses panel 
data for the period 1990-2002 and Arellano -Bond GMM estimations to explore the 
impact of institutional and policy reforms on the growth effects of entrepreneurship. She 
obtains empirical evidence suggesting that the interplay of trade reforms and 
entrepreneurship has a negative impact on growth, whereas the interplay of financial 
sector reform and entrepreneurship has a non-linear positive effect on growth.6 The joint 
effect of institutional reforms and entrepreneurship on growth is not significant though.  
 
3.  A model of entrepreneurship 
 
This section presents a model where entrepreneurship, specifically firm creation and 
growth, is constrained due to the lack of access to finance, which in turn is limited by the 
lack of collateral. The model is a streamlined version of the model in Brixiova and 
Kiyotaki (1997), which was developed for transition economies at the early stages of 
transition, with emerging private sectors. In this paper we apply it to African countries, 
where in many instances formal and productive private sector is still underdeveloped 
(AfDB, 2011 forthcoming).  
 
As the World Bank Enterprise Surveys document, one of the key constraints faced by 
firms in Africa is the lack of access to credit (Appendix A, Figure A1). By emphasizing 
the lack of collateral and the weak application of the rule of law, the framework below is 
particularly suitable for most African countries where the financial sectors are dominated 
by banks and binding credit constraints co-exist with excess liquidity. Specifically, the 
weak implementation of the legal framework makes banks require high collateral (in 
                                                 
6 This seems to be consistent with Claessens and Perotti (2007: 748) who conclude that financial 
liberalization with the view to increase access “may in practice increase fragility and inequality, and lead to 
political backlash against reforms,” in the absence of strong oversight institutions. 
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some cases over 100 percent of the loan), leaving the financial needs of many potential 
entrepreneurs unaddressed. We provide the details of the analytical framework below.  
The population is normalized to one and consists of infinitely-lived entrepreneurs –
dynasties7 – and workers, with population sharesµ  and µ−1 , respectively. All agents 
are endowed with one unit of time every period and have risk neutral preferences in 
consumption of a single good, c. When starting their search, entrepreneurs are endowed 
with net worth 00 >a . The entrepreneur searches for a business opportunity; the search 
costs her γ2/)( 2xxd =  units of the consumption good per unit of time; 0>γ is the 
parameter of search efficiency. In turn, she finds the opportunity according to a Poisson 
process with the arrival rate of x . She produces output )(y in the formal sector with labor 
)(n , productivity )(z and capital )(k according to the production function: 
 
αα
α
−
−=
1)(
1
1 nzky      (1) 
  
The output can be used either for investment or consumption. Capital is entrepreneur-
specific, implying that once the entrepreneur invests in it, she is the only one who can use 
the accumulated stock until she retires and passes it on to her successor. Due to 
imperfections in legal frameworks and property rights in Africa, the outside value of the 
accumulated capital is lower than its worth to the entrepreneur, and in some cases 
significantly so. Put differently, in the case of default, lenders can recover only )1( θ−  
portion of the accumulated capital, whereθ reflects the weaknesses in the legal 
framework. The lenders limit the loan to the entrepreneur,b , to the recoverable value of 
her capital, that is: 8 
 
kb )1( θ−≤      (2) 
 
The entrepreneur finances capital )(k from both borrowing )(b and her own net worth 
)(a , which she accumulates according to:  
 
crbwnyna −−−=&     (3) 
where w  is the wage rate and r is the real interest rate on debt, which in equilibrium 
equals the rate of time preference (and time t is suppressed. 
  
Private firms are destroyed at exogenously given rate r>δ . The exiting entrepreneur 
consumes all her accumulated net worth except 0a  which she passes on her successor, 
derives utility 0aa − , and dies immediately after. The successor searches for another 
                                                 
7 That is when the entrepreneur retires, she passes accumulated capital on to her successor.  
8 The value of θ  depends on the specificity of the capital and strength of the legal framework, including 
the bankruptcy law. Renting the capital is not an option as the rental market is mostly absent in Africa.  
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business opportunity, with the initial net worth 0a . In addition to the formal sector, 
output can be produced in the informal sector according to ααα −−= 1)1/(1 uuu NZY , 
where uZ  is productivity and uN is the informal sector employment. Denoting pm to be 
the share of entrepreneurs operating private firms and n the number of workers per firm, 
the following labor market equilibrium condition for workers needs to hold: 
 
nmN pu +=− µ1     (4) 
    
Letting um be the share of entrepreneurs searching for business opportunities and pm  the 
share of entrepreneurs running firms, the equilibrium conditions for entrepreneurs satisfy: 
   
pu mm +=µ       (5) 
 
The change in the number of entrepreneurs searching for business opportunities, um& , is 
given by the difference between inflows into the pool of searching entrepreneurs, 
pu mm δµδ =− )( and the exits from it, uxm . From (5), up mm && −= , with the initial value 
of number of private firms, 0pm , set to 0.  
 
uuupu xmmxmmm −−=−= )(µδδ&   (6) 
 
Taking wages and interest rates as given, the equilibrium is characterized by (i) 
entrepreneur’s choice of search effort, labor, capital, debt, and savings that maximize the 
expected discounted utility; (ii) worker’s choice of allocation of labor and consumption; 
(iii) products and debt markets that clear and (iv) labor markets that satisfy (4)-(6). 
 
The equilibrium wage rate rises in the aggregate capital stock )(K , and is determined as 
follows:  
 
)(
1
KwzKw ≡−= µ     (7)  
where dikK i∫=
µ
0
, with ik  being capital of an entrepreneur i .   
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With the constant return-to-scale production function and output price normalized to 1, 
profits are zero in equilibrium, that is kKRnKwnzk )()())(1/(1 1 +=− −ααα and the return 
on capital, )(KR becomes:9  
αα
α
α /)1()(
1
)( −−−= KzwKR                          (8) 
 
When KK < , the rate of return on capital is above the real interest rate on debt, 
rKR >)(  and the entrepreneur borrows up to the credit limit for capital investment, i.e. 
the credit constraint is binding and kb )1( θ−= . The entire net worth is spent on the 
down-payment for capital: θka = .  The return on net worth exceeds the real interest )(r  
by the leverage )/1( θ  times the difference between the return on capital that the 
entrepreneur owns and interest rate she pays for borrowing. 
 
Suppressing the time subscripts and denoting uJ  and )(aJ  as a present discounted value 
of an entrepreneur searching for a business opportunity and an entrepreneur running a 
private firm with net worth a , respectively, the corresponding Bellman equations are: 
 
[ ]
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −+−= uxu JaJxxrJ )(2max 0
2
γ    (9) 
 
       [ ] a
a
JaJJaaarJ u &∂
∂+−+−= ))(()( 0δ             (10) 
 
where (9) states that the return from searching for a business opportunity equals the net 
expected return from running a business with the net worth  0a . According to (10), the 
return on running a firm consists of gains from accumulating net worth and expected 
utility of consumption at the time of exiting from the labor force and net expected gain 
from search.10 
 
To solve for the steady state equilibrium, equation (10) can be re-written as follows, 
given the linearity of the utility function and the accumulation rule (3):  
 
                                                 
9 From profit maximizing condition for capital, αααα
α −−
−=
11
1
)( nkzKR .  Substituting the profit 
maximizing condition for labor, that is αα −= nzkKw )()( yields (8).  
10 The expected utility of consumption, a
a
J &∂
∂
, consists of the marginal value of net worth of an 
entrepreneur running a business and the change in net worth over time.  
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)()()( 00 aaaJaJ −+= β    (11) 
 
))(()( 000 aJJaarJ
u −+= δβ &    (12) 
 
δβθδβ −
−−= ))(( rKR&    (13) 
where β  denotes the marginal value of net worth of an entrepreneur running a business 
( aJ ∂∂ / ). Defining the shadow value of the business opportunity as uJaJ −= )( 0λ , i.e., 
the difference between the present discounted value of an entrepreneur running a firm 
with a net worth 0a and the entrepreneur searching for a business opportunity, marginal 
cost of search equals marginal benefit: λγ =/x and: 
 
0
2 )(2/ ar βλδγλλ −++=&     (14)  
 
ppp mmm δµγλ −−= )(&                      (15)  
 
KamKrKRrK p δθθ −+
−+≤ 0))(( &&          (16) 
 
The steady state equilibrium is described by (13) – (16), where 
.0==== Kmp &&&& λβ Moreover, the binding credit constraint implies that in equilibrium 
the number of entrepreneurs running private firms is limited (i.e., lower than in a 
situation without a binding credit constraint): rKRKrk >⇔−<+ *)()(
ˆ
0 δλδ
µλδγ ) , where 
K solves rKR =)( and λˆ solves 02 )(2/ rkr =++ λδγλ . This credit constraint, which is 
binding even in the presence of adequate liquidity, K , stems from the lack of 
collateral/net worth 0a , or  put differently, from high θ  (the share of entrepreneurs’ 
capital that cannot be pledged as collateral).  
 
The above model has at least two important empirical implications. First, the model 
suggests a positive relationship between firm creation and growth on one hand and 
measures of access to credit, notably banking sector development, liquidity, and 
informational depth of credit markets on the other. Secondly, the model points to a 
positive relationship between firm creation and growth and lender and borrower legal 
rights. Clearer and better enforced lender and borrower legal rights as well as easier 
availability of information on credit markets lead also to increased employment in the 
productive private sector. 
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4. Empirical analysis 
 
 4.1 Data and methodology 
 
We test the empirical relevance of our model for Africa in two ways. First, we examine 
graphically the association between variables of interest, which we define below. Second, 
we estimate, using regression models, the relationship between firm startups, indicators 
of financial development and liquidity in the banking sector, and indicators of the quality 
of laws and information governing collateral assets. The estimation equation is specified 
as follows: 
 
ENTi,t = α0 + α1LAWi,t+ α2CREDITi,t + α3 LIQi,t + β'Z + εi,t                                          (17) 
 
Where ENT (entrepreneurship), is proxied by ‘new business density’, which is measured 
by new business registrations per 1,000 people aged 15-64 from Doing Business database 
(World Bank database on line). New businesses registered are the number of new limited 
liability corporations registered in the calendar year.  
The right-hand side of equation (17) includes three main indicators of access to credit and 
collateral. The first is the strength of legal rights index (LAW), which “measures the 
degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and 
lenders and thus facilitate lending” (World Bank Doing Business database online). This 
index is measured on a 0-to-10 scale, with higher scores indicating that collateral and 
bankruptcy laws are better designed to expand access to credit. The second variable is the 
depth of credit information index (CREDIT), which “measures rules and practices 
affecting the coverage, scope and accessibility of credit information available through 
either a public credit registry or a private credit bureau” (World Bank Doing Business 
database online). This index is measured on a 0-to-6 scale, with higher scores indicating 
stronger depth of credit information. The third indicator is the ratio of bank liquid 
reserves to bank assets (LIQ).11 The Z vector includes additional control variables. These 
are domestic credit to the private sector (% of GDP), per-capita income (in log) and, in 
some estimations, ‘public credit registry coverage (% of adults)’ and broad money. In the 
robustness checks, we also control for the cost of business start-up procedures (% of GNI 
per capita), and for human capital (the results associated with human capital are omitted 
due to consistent lack of statistical significance).  
All variables are from the World Bank databases online (World Development Indicators 
and Doing Business). For the countries in our sample, data on the dependent variable are 
available only for the period 2004-2009, while data on the strength of legal rights and 
depth of credit information are available only since 2005. We can thus only include data 
for the period 2005-2009. We have an unbalanced panel and the sample includes 20 
                                                 
11 An important constraint to credit supply in most African banking sectors is the shortage of long-term 
loanable funds. Unfortunately it is difficult to get good data on this and our model does not include it, but it 
is important to acknowledge this issue for further research. 
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countries. The sample is reduced to 11 countries when we control for the effects of bank 
liquid reserves due to lack of data on this variable in the other nine countries.  
 
The empirical analysis is implemented using pooled-panel and random-effects 
generalized least squares (GLS) estimations. Table 1 shows correlations among relevant 
variables. The estimation results are presented in Tables 2 and 3. 
 
4.2 Graphical examination12  
 
Figure 1 portrays the fitted relationship between new business density and the strength of 
legal rights. Our theoretical model suggests that we should find a positive relationship 
between the two. Figure 1, however, shows that the relationship has an inverted-U form; 
it is initially positive then turns negative after the index reaches a value of about 6. Given 
that in our sample most countries (14 out of 20 countries in the large sample), have 
values of the legal rights index less than 6, this suggests that strengthening legal rights in 
credit markets would have a positive impact.13 Figure 2 shows the association between 
the depth of credit information and new business density. Again, the relationship seems 
to be nonlinear and the graph suggests diminishing returns to improvements in the depth 
of credit information, although the correlation appears weak. 
 
In addition, we use data from the World Bank's Enterprise database on a large group of 
African countries (not all in our sample)14 on loans requiring collateral, value of collateral 
needed for a loan, and the percentage of firms identifying access to finance as a major 
constraint. 
 
In Figures 3 and 4, we show the association (fitted values) of new business density with 
loans requiring collateral  (percent of the loan amount) and the  value of collateral needed 
for a loan (percent of the loan amount), respectively. There is a clear negative association 
of new business density with the percentage of loans requiring collateral and with the 
value of the collateral. This seems to be confirmed by the relationship portrayed in Figure 
5. There is a positive association between ‘access to finance being a major constraint’ and 
the value of collateral need for a loan. 
 
4.3 Estimation results 
 
Table 1 presents the coefficients of correlation among relevant variables. The correlations 
of new business density with the ratio of self-employed (in total employed), the cost of 
business startup, and bank liquid reserves-to-bank assets ratio are negative and 
statistically significant. The correlation of new business density with income, the ratio of 
broad money, and the ratio of credit to the private sector is positive and statistically 
                                                 
12 See also the graphs in Appendix A 
13 This observation can be in part explained by excessive resort to legal systems in countries with stronger 
legal rights for lenders and borrowers, with entrepreneurs and lenders spending time in court rather than 
searching for profitable business opportunities.  
14 We could not use data from this database for our estimations since the countries in our sample did not 
have values for these variables which would have severely limited the number of observations. 
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significant. On the other hand, there is no significant correlation between new business 
density and the strength of legal rights or the depth of credit information. In all the cases 
where the coefficients are statistically significant, the coefficients related to correlations 
of self-employed with the other variables have opposite signs relative to the coefficients 
related to correlation between new business density and the other variables. This seems to 
suggest that self-employment and new business density behave in completely different 
ways and could be affected by different factors. The two main indicators of the quality of 
credit markets (strength of legal rights and the depth of credit information) do not have 
significant positive correlation with new business density or the ratio of self-employed.  
   
Table 2 reports the results from OLS estimations on pooled-panel data. We note that 
income and the strength of legal rights have positive and statistically significant 
coefficients and these results are robust. On the other hand, the coefficient on the variable 
‘depth of credit information’ is negative and statistically significant in three estimations 
(columns 2-4) and positive but nonsignificant in three other estimations (columns 5-7). 
Interestingly, the indicators of liquidity and financial market development either have a 
negative coefficient (bank liquid reserves to bank assets ratio in columns 3-5), or are 
statistically nonsignificant (broad money and credit to the private sector in columns 6 and 
7, respectively). In columns 5-7, we investigate the presence of non-linearity of the 
relationship between new business density and the strength of legal rights and the depth 
of credit information. The results indicate the relationship between new business density 
and the strength of legal rights has an inverted-U shape.  
 
Next, we perform random effects GLS estimations and report the results in Table 3.15 
Again, the results show that there is strong evidence that new business density is 
positively associated with per-capita income. On the other hand, the relationship of new 
business density with the strength of legal rights and the depth of credit information has 
an inverted-U shape. This seems to suggest that returns or gains from reforms are high at 
low levels of “quality”/development of institutions, and lower at higher levels of 
institutional sophistication/development. It supports investments in reforms for less 
developed countries where institutions are disproportionately weak.  
 
As an additional robustness check, we also control for the cost of business startup. 
However, this variable turns out to be statistically nonsignificant. As noted earlier, in 
other estimations (not shown but results may be requested from the authors), we control 
for the role of primary and secondary school enrolments (proxies for human capital), but 
these variables were statistically nonsignificant. 
 
The results in Table 3 show that the turning point for the strength of legal rights occurs 
where the index values between 6.0-6.9, whereas the turning point for the depth of credit 
information is for a value of about 2.75. In our sample,  only three countries, Kenya, 
South Africa, and Tunisia, had values for the depth of credit information higher than 3. 
Four countries—Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia — have values for the index 
of the strength of legal rights greater than 7. Thus, the majority (at least 75%) of the 
                                                 
15 In contrast to the OLS method, the GLS estimation technique eliminates the correlation over time. 
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countries are at or below the turning point and should still see a positive link between 
entrepreneurship (measured by new business density) and improvements in the strength 
of legal rights and the depth of credit information. Put differently, entrepreneurs in 
African countries where a binding credit constraint exists in spite of excess bank liquidity 
and where the quality of the strength of legal rights (protection of lender and borrower 
rights) and the depth of credit information is poor, would benefit significantly from 
improvements in legal rights and the depth of credit information. 
 
5. Summary and policy implications 
 
In this paper, we proposed a theoretical model that is applicable to African credit markets 
where entrepreneurship, or specifically the creation and growth of private firms, hinge on 
matching potential entrepreneurs with productive technologies and on access to capital. 
The implications of the model are tested empirically using a sample of 20 African 
countries over the period 2005-09.  Two estimation techniques are used: the pooled-panel 
data regressions and random-effects GLS estimations. We use new business registrations 
per one thousand people aged 15-64 as proxy for entrepreneurship. 
 
A first result of the empirical analysis is that the quality of legal rights has a positive 
impact on ‘new business’ density, our proxy for entrepreneurship. More interestingly, the 
relationship is shown to be non-linear, depicting an inverted-U shape. The estimated 
coefficients suggest a turning point of the index of the quality of legal rights in the range 
of 6-6.9 (on a range of 0-10). Only four countries in the sample have an index above 7. 
This suggests that the majority of African countries would benefit from policies leading 
to improvements in the quality of legal rights as this will promote entrepreneurship. 
 
Secondly, we find an inverted-U shaped relationship between new business density and 
the depth of credit information. The turning point of the index of the depth of credit 
market information is about 2.75. Only three countries have an index above 3. This again 
suggests that African countries can gain substantially from policy interventions aimed at 
developing information on borrowers and creditors, as this would facilitate identification 
of profitable activities and increase access to credit for new entrepreneurs. 
 
The results in this study provide pertinent policy insights for the agenda of promoting 
productive entrepreneurship in Africa. This naturally is no easy task. Yet, it must be a 
central component of a national strategy for achieving growth that is strong, sustained 
and shared.16 This in turn is a key prerequisite for prosperity on the continent in terms of 
economic wellbeing as well as social and political stability.  
 
Indeed as the recent developments in North Africa17 and the unfolding events in other 
parts of the continent demonstrate, the failure to build a national economy that provides 
opportunities for social and economic upward mobility for the majority of the population 
has dire consequences on national political stability. Given the very high rates of youth 
                                                 
16 For a discussion of the prerequisites for strong, sustained, and shared growth in Africa, see, among 
others: Kasekende, Brixiova, and Ndikumana (2010); AfDB, UNECA, and AU (2010). 
17 See AfDB (2011) for an analysis of the factors that led to the political crisis in Tunisia. 
 13
unemployment across Africa, it is likely that regimes will continue to face strong pressure 
from the tide of the youth that feels disenfranchised due to lack of employment 
opportunities. However, African government sectors are not able to absorb the growing 
labor supply on the continent. Besides attracting FDI, the attention then must turn to 
strategies for supporting productive entrepreneurship as a way of building a national 
economy that is sustainable and able to compete regionally and globally.   
 
Supporting productive entrepreneurship requires a wide range of policy interventions 
aimed at alleviating underlying economy-specific constraints. The evidence in this paper 
points to two key areas policy interventions that have potentially high impact on 
entrepreneurship, namely: promoting access to credit, and improving the business 
environment especially in the area of design and enforcement of legal rights. 
 
This study particularly stresses the problem of access to credit arising from the inability 
of potential entrepreneurs to meet the collateral requirements imposed by financial 
institutions. In the case of African banking systems, the problem is not so much that of 
lack of resources per se, but rather weak legal systems that do not enable lenders to 
recover fully the pledged collateral. As result, excess liquidity in the banking sectors co-
exists with credit constraints. This suggests that in addition to interventions aimed at 
containing the cost of credit, policy interventions must also focus on strengthening legal 
systems alongside alleviating the quantitative barriers to access to credit. 
 
The setting up and strengthening of credit bureaus and associated institutions that collect 
information on creditors and borrowers constitutes a key element of strategy to promote 
productive entrepreneurship. The gains arise both through the reduction of perceived 
credit risk as well as through the provision of market signals on the profitability of 
various investment activities in the economy. New and innovative methods such 
psychometric testing of loan applicants on their willingness to repay loans applied by, for 
example, Standard Bank in some East and Southern Africa countries can also help ease 
credit constraints. These initiatives in turn encourage entrepreneurship and enhance 
efficiency in the allocation of investment capital across activities. The potentially high 
social returns to investments in setting up these institutions and methods justify the 
scaling up of budgetary and aid allocations to support such policy initiatives as part of the 
broader agenda for promoting private sector development in the continent.  
 
Despite some progress made in liberalizing financial systems in Africa, there is still a 
long way to go to achieve efficiency in the sector. A key constraint is the lack of 
competition in the banking sector, which in turn manifests itself in excessive collateral 
requirements. While government direct control and ownership of financial institutions 
have declined substantially, indirect control on credit allocation is still prevalent. This 
control results in allocational inefficiencies of loanable funds: bank credit is allocated to 
politically connected individuals and bank insiders at relatively low interest rates, some 
of which finances unproductive activities.18 At the same time, the SMEs are ‘priced out’ 
                                                 
18 In a detailed case study on the financial sector in Burundi, Nkurunziza, Ndikumana and Nyamoya (2011) 
provide evidence on inefficiencies in the allocation of resources that are driven by political interference in 
the management of the financial institutions.  
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of the market due to high cost of borrowing (collateral). Increasing competition and 
reducing political influence on the functioning of financial institutions are key 
prerequisites to promoting access to credit as a means of supporting entrepreneurship. 
 
This paper thus suggests that emphasis should be on three interventions: (1) design and 
enforcement of legal rights especially targeting collateralizable assets; (2) fostering 
competition in the banking sector, especially in terms of access to credit; (3) developing 
and strengthening institutions and mechanisms for access to creditor and borrower 
information. It is particularly important to design and enforce property rights that enable 
entrepreneurs to utilize their durable assets, such as land, to secure bank loans. In most 
African countries, this is not possible as households do not have formal titles to their 
land, and the constraint is often particularly severe for women-headed households. 
 
Taking a broader view, as new entrepreneurs are viewed as risky by banks, they are less 
likely to secure the needed capital to start businesses. It is not in the banks’ best interest 
to lend to such borrowers given the high risk and also because they have alternative, less 
risky activities to lend to. Given the high social returns to supporting entrepreneurship 
though, the costs associated with the risk inherent to lending to new productive activities 
should be spread across the society. This could be done through the design of loan 
guarantee schemes or grants, with explicit and detailed provisions to ensure that the funds 
covered by the schemes are directly financing new activities. This may require, among 
others, tracking mechanisms to minimize the risk of diversion of the resources into 
speculative activities. We leave this important topic for further research.  
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Figure 1.  Strength of legal rights and entrepreneurship  
 
 
Figure 2.  Depth of credit information and entrepreneurship 
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Figure 3.  Loans requiring collateral (%) and new business density 
 
 
Figure 4.  Value of collateral and new business density 
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Figure 5.  Value of collateral and finance as a major constraint 
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Table1 
Correlations 
 
 
P-values are in brackets. 
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Self-employed -0.542   
[0.01] 
       
Cost of business start-
up procedures (% of 
GNI per capita) 
-0.319  
[0.00] 
0.686   
[0.00] 
      
Income 0.595 
[0.00]  
-0.827 
[0.00]    
-0.631 
[0.00]       
     
Bank liquid reserves to 
bank assets ratio (%) 
-0.334 
[0.00]     
0.145 
[0.42]     
-0.283  
[0.00]         
0.313   
[0.00]      
    
Broad money            
(% GDP) 
0.441 
[0.00]     
-0.515  
 [0.00]     
-0.415 
[0.00]         
0.594  
[0.00]      
-0.013   
[0.88]       
   
Credit to private 
sector (% GDP) 
0.343  
 [0.00]     
-0.552 
[0.00]     
-0.359 
[0.00]         
0.554  
[0.00]      
-0.338  
[0.00]          
0.710  
[0.00]     
  
Strength of legal rights 0.037 
 [0.72]     
0.235  
[0.48]     
-0.202 
[0.01]        
0.057  
[0.59]      
-0.172 
[0.15]          
0.146 
[0.13]   
0.188 
[0.05]    
 
Depth of credit 
information 
0.117  
[0.27]     
-0.437 
 [0.17]     
-0.346  
[0.00]      
0.613   
[0.00]     
0.186 
[0.12]     
0.411 
[0.00]     
0.616   
 [0.00]     
0.116  
[0.17]      
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Table 2 
Pooled-data estimates 
 Dependent variable: New business density 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Income (log) 0.681*** 
(0.24) 
1.017*** 
(0.33) 
1.889*** 
(0.58) 
2.661*** 
(0.58) 
2.24*** 
(0.48) 
1.28*** 
(0.27) 
1.17*** 
(0.70) 
Strength of legal rights  0.135*** 
(0.05) 
0.132** 
(0.05) 
0.271** 
(0.10) 
0.286** 
(0.12) 
3.65*** 
(1.06) 
1.76** 
(0.85) 
1.62** 
(0.77) 
Public credit registry 
coverage (% of adults) 
0.196*** 
(0.09) 
0.178* 
(0.09) 
0.153 
(0.13) 
    
Depth of credit 
information  
 -0.414** 
(0.18) 
-0.680*** 
(0.24) 
-0.495*** 
(0.17) 
1.441 
(1.01) 
0.463 
(0.73) 
0.623 
(0.74) 
Bank liquid reserves to 
bank assets ratio (%) 
  -2.449* 
(1.28) 
-4.750*** 
(1.39) 
-3.891*** 
(0.96) 
  
Strength of legal 
rights_squared 
    -0.264*** 
(0.07) 
-0.133** 
(0.06) 
-0.123** 
(0.06) 
Depth of credit 
information_squared 
    -0.354 
(0.21) 
-0.174 
(0.135) 
-0.271 
(0.162) 
Broad money 
(% of GDP) 
     -0.010 
(0.11) 
 
Credit to private sector (% 
of GDP) 
      0.021 
(0.013) 
Observations 74 74 42        42        42 73 73 
Fstat  8.15 9.69 3.85 7.88 6.27 6.04 5.54 
R-squared 0.50 0.57 0.65 0.61 0.72 0.50 0.53 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
* indicates significance at 0.10 ** indicates significance at 0.05 and *** indicates significance at 0.01.
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Table 3 
Random-effects GLS estimates 
 
 Dependent variable: New business density 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income (log) 2.153*** 
(0.64) 
0.978** 
(0.41) 
2.388*** 
(0.74) 
1.003** 
(0.43) 
Strength of legal rights  3.82*** 
(1.44) 
1.78* 
(0.95) 
3.89*** 
(1.5) 
1.78* 
(0.96) 
Depth of credit information  0.993*** 
(0.19) 
0.495*** 
(0.15) 
0.959*** 
(0.20) 
0.493*** 
(0.16) 
Bank liquid reserves to bank assets 
ratio (%) 
-1.162*** 
(0.58) 
 -1.07* 
(0.59) 
 
Strength of legal rights_squared -0.278** 
(0.11) 
-0.148* 
(0.08) 
-0.280** 
(0.12) 
-0.148* 
(0.08) 
Depth of credit information_squared -0.186*** 
(0.04) 
-0.089** 
(0.04) 
-0.175*** 
(0.04) 
-0.089** 
(0.03) 
Credit to private sector (% of GDP)  0.009 
(0.01) 
 0.009 
(0.009) 
Cost of business start-up procedures 
(% of GNI per capita) 
  0.003 
(0.004) 
0.0003 
(0.001) 
Observations        42 73        42 73 
Wald chi2  
Prob > chi2 
53.58 
(0.00) 
30.59 
(0.00) 
53.02 
(0.00) 
30.20 
(0.00) 
R-squared  
     Within 
     Between 
      Overall 
 
0.60 
0.63 
0.65 
 
0.26 
0.44 
0.43 
 
0.60 
0.65 
0.67 
 
0.26 
0.44 
0.43 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
* indicates significance at 0.10 ** indicates significance at 0.05 and *** indicates significance at 0.01. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
Figure A1.   Access to finance and collateralization                                 Figure A2. Extent of formal registration 
.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source of data: Enterprise survey, World Bank's Enterprise database (based on various years during 2002-2010) 
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Figure A3.  % of Firms Formally Registered when Started                       Figure A4. Number of years firms operated without                                 
                      Operations in the Country                                                                          formal registration                                                                        
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source of data: World Bank's Enterprise database (based on various years during 2007-2010) 
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Figure A5: Percentage of firms identifying access to finance as a major constraint 
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Source of data: World Bank's Enterprise database (based on various years during 2007-2010) 
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Figure A6. Percentage of firms using banks to finance investments and firms with lines of   
credit or loans from financial institutions 
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Figure A7. Loans requiring collateral and value of collateral  
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Appendix B 
 
 
Table B1 
List of countries 
Algeria Madagascar* Senegal* 
Burkina Faso* Malawi* South Africa 
Egypt Mauritius Togo 
Ethiopia* Morocco Tunisia 
Gabon* Niger* Uganda 
Ghana Nigeria* Zambia 
Kenya Rwanda*  
* Not included in the larger sample (20 countries). 
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